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Abstract
Homicides, induced by the drug war, in Ciudad Juárez drastically increased beginning in
2007. Few studies have been carried out which asses the economic impacts of crime and
homicides. Furthermore, the existing literature lacks regional assessment efforts (Rios 2008).
Because of geographical proximity and close economic ties, this paper reviews some of the
potential impacts the Ciudad Juárez homicides may have on the El Paso regional economy. A
time series data approach is employed to assess potential impacts on factors including the El
Paso metro business cycle index, El Paso employment, and El Paso retail sales. Findings indicate
that fluctuations in the number of Ciudad Juárez homicides impact the El Paso metro business
cycle index and El Paso employment in a direct and statistically significant manner while the
results for retail sales are inconclusive.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

El Paso and Ciudad Juárez together form one of the largest borderplex metropolitan economies
in the world. According to the U.S. Census Bureau and Mexico’s Censo, population reached over 2.1
million individuals in the El Paso-Juárez region by the year 2010. This U.S.-Mexico borderplex region is
the most populated in Texas and second in the nation only to the San Diego-Tijuana borderplex. The
U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics indicates that in 2010 there were more than 25.2 million
crossings of individuals through the El Paso ports of entry to make way into El Paso from Ciudad
Juárez, Mexico. These individuals cross into El Paso to engage in numerous activities directly impacting
the El Paso economy. They often visit relatives who reside in El Paso or shop for everything from
automobiles and designer clothes to soft drinks (Cañas 2002). It is also not uncommon for Ciudad Juárez
commuters to be employed and or have children that attend school in the U.S. side of the Rio Grande
River (Payan 2006). Although the number of commuters into El Paso during 2010 was large in
magnitude, it was nearly 42 percent lower relative 2006 (U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2012).
The number of north bound commuters was not the only noticeable variable that experienced contraction
during this period. Other El Paso key economic factors such as employment, metro business cycle, and
retail sales did so as well. This may be highly attributable to the so-called Great Recession that began in
2007. Economic indicators show that the El Paso’s economy did in fact join the 2007-2009 recession;
however, the local economic downturn was milder. It is reported that El Paso ranked as one of the
strongest metro economies during the recession (Brooking’s Rankings 2012). The question then turns to,
are there perhaps factors beyond the traditional border-economics convention that may have helped the
El Paso economy weather the recession?
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While the Great Recession was underway in the U.S., homicides, induced by the drug war, in
Ciudad Juárez drastically increased beginning in 2007. For instance, in 2007, there were 136
documented homicides (Presidencia de la República 2011). This number itself is alarming. However, by
2010, the number increased by 20 times to a startling 2,738 homicides for that year. Undeniably, the
crime and violence in Mexico may be attributed in large to the major drug cartels (Widner et al 2011).
Ciudad Juárez has been at the epicenter of Mexico’s widespread drug trade trafficking violence. It is
publicized that cartels in Ciudad Juárez, and many northern border –cities, have waged a war over the
major corridors into the United States (Widner et al 2011, Payan 2006, Congressional Research Service
2011, Salazar and Olson 2011, WSJ 2009). These events have left many dead and a region in fear.

Few studies have been carried out which asses the economic impacts of crime and homicides
(Rios 2008). Furthermore, the existing literature lacks regional assessment efforts. Because of
geographical proximity and close economic ties, this paper reviews some of the potential impacts the
Ciudad Juárez homicides may have on the El Paso regional economy. A time series data approach is
employed to assess potential impacts on factors including a metro business cycle index, employment,
and retail sales on the El Paso side of the border. Findings indicate that fluctuations in the number of
Ciudad Juárez homicides impact the El Paso metro business cycle index and El Paso employment in a
direct and statistically significant manner. Correlation between the number of Ciudad Juárez homicides
and El Paso retail sales produce statistically inconclusive results.

The succeeding section of the paper includes a concise discussion of the literature concerning
economic ties between border cities in the U.S. and Mexico as well as some insight about the current
drug war in Ciudad Juárez. Section three discusses the data and methodology employed for the study at
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hand. Section four is a presentation of the empirical results. Summary and closing remarks are provided
in the concluding section.

3

Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1

CROSS BORDER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

It is of importance to note that the study of border regions is not a straight forward undertaking.
This is due in part because such regions, like El Paso, face influence not only from U.S. business cycles
but also national business cycles in Mexico, as well as regional business patterns in Ciudad Juárez
(Fullerton 2001). Although a textbook for the topic of border economics is yet absent, several topics of
importance can be identified. Topics include business cycles transmissions, exchange rates, industrial
development, and labor markets, just to name a few (Fullerton 2003).

Cross-border trade is a key component of economic conditions along the U.S. and Mexico
border. It is of no surprise that because of factors such as geographical proximity and economic
linkages, these two economies have evolved from competing with each other to being complements
(Cañas 2002). Border economic research has become attractive in recent decades due in part to the
acceleration in demographics, commercial, and industrial expansion as a result of trade liberalization
and other forms of business deregulation between border economies (Fullerton 2003). After the mid1990s, perhaps when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was enacted, research shows
that there was an escalation in economic integration between U.S.-Mexico border city-pairs (Cañas et al
2011). Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2005) study the effect of NAFTA on correlation patterns between
Mexico and the U.S., paying emphasis to the manufacturing sector. Findings indicate that prior to
NAFTA, the cross-correlations between Mexico and U.S. manufacturing output are statistically
insignificant at all lags for the observed series, while those for the business-cycle components of the
series are relatively small and appear significant only at 7-10 quarter lags. After NAFTA, the correlation
between Mexican and U.S. manufacturing output became stronger; a significant long-run link between
4

them seems to have evolved; and their cyclical movements have inclined to become roughly
contemporaneous (Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia 2005). This further infers that interdependence of cross
border business cycles has grown over time, due in part to NAFTA.

Trade between these neighboring economies has evolved significantly. From 1993 to 2003, total
trade between the U.S. and Mexico increased by 189 percent from $81.4 billion to $235.5 billion. Since
then to 2010, trade has increased by an additional 53 percent totaling $360.4 billion (U.S. International
Trade Commission 2012). It is noted that a large number of industries underwent large increases in
intra-industry trade over the first five year after NAFTA (Clark et al 2001). Gilmer (2004) reports that
about 80 percent of U.S.-Mexico trade is intra-industry trade; a key feature that may have played a role
in the countries’ increased economic synchronization. It is of value noting that Texas is by far the largest
trading U.S. state with Mexico. Exports to Mexico from the state of Texas increased from $41.561
billion in 2003 to $72.627 billion in 2010 (World Institute of Strategic Economic Research 2012).
Furthermore, in the U.S., the El Paso/southern New Mexico region is the second largest land port in
terms of trade with Mexico with a share of 21.7 percent of total exports and 21.7 percent of total
imports. The El Paso region is second after only the Laredo/south Texas region that captures 60.4
percent of exports and 53.2 percent of imports (Texas Center for Border Economic and Enterprise
Development 2012).

Coincident economic indicators are frequently used to study business cycles and determine
whether an economy is in recession, recovery, or expansion. It is of modest surprise due to some of the
findings reported in this section that between 1993 and 2004, the correlation coefficient between the
coincident indices of economic activity in the U.S. and Mexico increased. Gilmer (2004) reports an
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increase in the correlation coefficient between the coincident indices from 0.73 to 0.96 by 2004. This
may be interpreted as evidence of the increased economic integration between the U.S. and Mexico
There has been a growing body of research that attempts to build regional coincident economic
indicators, also known as regional business cycle indexes. Phillips and Cañas (2006) study how the
business cycles of four MSAs in Texas are connected to those of the broader economies that surround
them. Their findings indicate that since 1994, the business cycles of the southern border MSAs of
Brownsville, McAllen, and Laredo have moved in a more like fashion to the business cycle in Mexico.
They report that El Paso’s economy has become relatively more aligned with cycles in Texas and the
US. More so, spectral analysis provided statistically significant evidence that the relationship between El
Paso and the economies of Mexico and Texas had increased. Note that the maquiladora industry has
heavy integration with the U.S. and Texas economies. In 2001, when there was a sharp decline in the
maquiladora industry, as a result of U.S. manufacturing decline, El Paso’s business cycle declined more
than the other border cities (Phillips and Cañas 2006). This may be explained because of the strong
economic ties that El Paso has with the maquiladora industry in Ciudad Juárez. This being, while the
other three southern MSAs depend on Mexican national’s retail activity more heavily than El Paso does.

2.2

MAQUILADORA STUDIES

Maquiladoras have acted as a major economic force along the border since the rise of the
maquiladora industry after the enactment of the Border Industrialization program in the 1960s. The main
objective of such program was to reduce high unemployment rates in communities along the border
following the abolition of the Bracero farm labor program by the U.S. (Ayers and Layton 1974). In-bond
assembly activities contribute a large number of jobs and thus influence income, retail sales, and
demographic development throughout this region (Coronado et al 2004). Studies show strong linkages
6

between El Paso and Ciudad Juárez as a response to maquiladora activity. Sprinkle documents that
Ciudad Juárez maquiladoras account for one in five jobs created in El Paso during the early 1980s
(Sprinkle 1986). Subsequent to NAFTA, El Paso became progressively more dependent on the U.S.
economy and implicitly on the Juárez economy. This is due to the ties of the U.S. with the maquiladora
industry in Ciudad Juárez, which has the most maquiladora jobs in Mexico (Phillips and Cañas 2003).
Findings estimate that a 10 percent increase in maquiladora value added leads to 0.88 percent growth in
El Paso employment (Mollick 2006). Hanson (2001) documents that a 10 percent increase in
maquiladora production in Mexican border cities leads to a 1.1 to 2.0 percent increase in employment in
the U.S. neighbor cities. The study was later updated using additional recent data and indicate that a 10
percent increase in maquiladora production in Mexican border cities leads to a 0.5-0.9 percent increase
in employment in U.S. neighboring border cities (Cañas et al 2011). More specific, Cañas et al (2011)
also report that El Paso’s maquiladora elasticity on employment is 2.8 percent. That is to say, a 10
percent increase in export production in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico leads to a near 3 percent increase in
overall nonfarm employment in El Paso. The authors also look at specific sectors across each city. They
find that the manufacturing sector does not respond significantly. They note that this is perhaps a
response to modern supply chains that mandate just-in-time inventory. The transportation, finance,
insurance, real estate, and business and personal services sectors carry significant results for El Paso.

Fullerton and Schauer (2001) utilize short-term time series characteristics of the Ciudad Juárez
maquiladora sector in an attempt to clarify labor market behavior. Empirical results indicate that real
wages, factories in operation, U.S. industrial performance, and the international value of the peso play
significant roles in determining month-to-month fluctuations in borderplex maquiladora payrolls. Such
findings further point to the economic linkages these two economies face despite being divided by an
international border.
7

2.3

CROSS BORDER RETAIL

Retail activity is another factor where one can study the economic link between El Paso and
Ciudad Juárez. Residents of Ciudad Juárez, and those surrounding from the state of Chihuahua, find
themselves within the retail spectrum of El Paso. People make way across the border, in both directions,
on a daily basis to purchase goods and services. This is in response to differences in varieties and
adjusted prices and also such things as laws, policies, and consumer safety regulations (Coronado and
Phillips 2007). Coronado and Phillips estimate purchasing power of local residents using personal
income and employment thus enabling them to estimate exported retail sales for El Paso. Reported
findings indicate 11 percent of retail sales in El Paso from 1970 to 2001 could be attributed to Mexican
shoppers (Cañas et al 2006). In a later study using pooled data across 23 MSAs in Texas, findings
indicate that Mexican nationals account for about 1.9 percent of Texas retail trade on average (Coronado
and Phillips 2007). The same study reports that El Paso’s exportable retail sales during 2001 were about
6 percent. This figure is well below El Paso’s 11.3 averages. However, it is significant to mention
because it is noted that such low figure may be a result of constricted maquiladora activity that year.

In an unpublished manuscript, Coronado et al (2012), attempt to estimate cross border retail
trade. They do so by improving the consumption model used in Coronado and Phillips (2007) by
accounting for wealth effects, housing and retirement plans, in addition to income in the estimation. In
essence, local retail sales are estimated. The authors then subtract the estimate from the reported actual.
The resulting balance is labeled as exported retail activity. More specifically: 40-45 percent for Laredo,
40 percent for McAllen, 30 percent for Brownsville, and 10-12 percent for El Paso. The authors also
verify if the exportable retail sales estimates respond to conventional economic factors such as Mexico’s
8

business cycle, fluctuations in the peso/dollar exchange rate, and regional market conditions. Results
indicate that exportable retail sales characterize a significant share of Texas border cities retail activity.
Results also indicate that retail sales estimates are sensitive to the economic factors mentioned above as
well as distance and population size of Mexican northern cities.

Historical national threats have also had an indirect impact on the El Paso local economy.
Fullerton (2007) examines the potential impacts El Paso’s economy may have experienced as a
consequence of the September 11, 2001 events. Although such events took place miles away from El
Paso, regional activity involves areas that may be affected such as international ports of entry. Evidence
of disruptions for El Paso’s retail sector is small. However, findings did indicate that retail sales in
Ciudad Juárez exhibit significant positive impacts as shoppers are more likely to remain on the south
side of the border. This is due to greater opportunity cost of additional time spent waiting to cross over
to El Paso as direct result of tighter security.

Exchange rates are a key influence to the number of commuters into U.S. border cities. This is
because fluctuations in the real value of the Mexican peso alter the relative prices of American goods for
Mexican nationals and vise versa. This, in turn, directly affects purchasing power and thus alters the
behavior of consumers. In response, Mexican customer traffic across the border is impacted by
fluctuations in the real value of the peso (Anonymous 1998, Michael and Barta 1997). Fullerton (2000)
finds that northbound bridge traffic to El Paso is non-random and follows fairly well defined patterns.
Furthermore, the loss of Mexican purchasing power results in a decrease in northbound bridge traffic in
the central region of the two cities. In the downtown region, the effect was to increase northbound
traffic.

Although peso devaluations did not noticeably affect traffic in the eastern portion of the

international metroplex, the aggregate impact was shown to be positive for the sample period.
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During the “Tequila Effect” peso devaluation that lasted from late 1994 through the first quarter
of 1996, the peso was devaluated by as much as 60 percent. As a result, Mexican purchasing power fell
by just as much (Cañas 2002).The reduction of such purchasing power was not absent of consequence.
Fullerton and Schauer (2001) report that, in El Paso, there was a reduction in overall growth and
approximately 60 retail outlets closed. Fullerton and Schauer report that retail activity in El Paso
typically hurts when Mexican purchasing power is reduced by large scale devaluations. Cañas reports
that during Mexico’s 1994 peso devaluation, real wages in Ciudad Juárez declined 13 percent and as a
result, El Paso’s retail employment declined (Cañas 2002). Patrick and Renforth (1996) surveyed Texas
border cities in aim of assessing the impact of retail sales due to the 1994 peso devaluation. Their
findings indicate a 41.8 percent decline, however vary by, store type, distance from the border, and
relative domestic market size.

Exchange rate analysis has produced mixed results for the El Paso-Juárez retail sector. Coronado
and Phillips (2007) estimate correlation coefficients between border retail sales and the real exchange
rate. Results indicate that El Paso is the least responsive metropolitan statistical area in Texas to
fluctuations in the real exchange rate. They further analyze the relationship by performing Granger
causality tests on the sensitivity of overall retail sales for the four MSAs to changes in the real value of
the peso. Results indicate that changes in the real exchange rate granger cause changes in retail sales for
all border MSAs except in El Paso. Furthermore, they estimate VAR models using log levels of retail
sales and real exchange rate. El Paso reports the lowest and most statistically insignificant impacts
(Coronado Phillips 2007). It is important to note that Coronado and Phillips look solely at the retail
sector. Such findings were also explained by pointing out El Paso’s small share of retail to Mexican
nationals, relative other border cities that have higher percent shares. Nonetheless, the estimated
10

11percent share to Mexican nationals is significant and should not be over looked. Despite the mixed
findings in the literature, including real exchange rates in this study should prove useful because of the
conventional economic knowledge concerning exchange rates and international markets.
2.4

DRUGS AND VIOLENCE

Drug trafficking is indirectly part of Mexico’s overall economy; it impacts economic factors
such as: employment, cash flows, investment, income, and consumption (Rios 2008). It has been noted
that Mexico’s economic condition is to some degree influenced by illegal drug activity and could
experience a severe destabilization given discontinuance in the flow of drug dollars (Fazio 1998). This
illegitimate practice has been estimated to provide primary employment opportunities to more than
450,000 individuals and account for 3 to 4 percent of Mexico’s more than $1 trillion GDP on the order
of $30 billion per year (Shirk 2011). Low costs of production and high profit margins are what have
drawn individuals to enter the drug trafficking industry in Mexico (Payan 2006). Estimates, considering
deviations in prices, demand, and loss due to seizures, place profits at $9.91 billion dollars in annual
profits to its participants (Resa 2003). Although this figure is only an estimation bounded by limited
data, the Mexican illegal drug industry has undoubtedly become a highly profitable and large industry in
Mexico.

Because of the efforts brought by U.S. law enforcement to shut down the once powerful drug
organization in Mexico headed by Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo during the late 1980s, Felix Gallardo
ordered territorial division of his organization. As a result four regions would emerge: the Tijuana,
Sinaloa-Sonora, Gulf, and Juárez Cartels and their corresponding corridors (Payan 2006, Salazar and
Olson 2011). Post 1980, Colombian cartels have also been using Mexico, with profound assistance from
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Mexican Cartels, as a gate way into the U.S. for cocaine smuggling (Payan 2006, Rios 2008, Shirk
2011).
The Congressional Research Service (2011) states that Mexico is a major producer and supplier
to the U.S. market of heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana. It also states that Mexico is the major
transit country for more than 95 percent of the cocaine sold in the United States. Payan (2006) estimates
that 70 percent of drugs all consumed in the U.S. come across its southwest international counterpart.
Such drugs cross the border to meet the demand of 20 million U.S. consumers (Payan 2006). The
Congressional Research Service approximates that in 2009, about 21.8 million individuals in the U.S.
were current illegal drug users. That figure represents 9 percent of individuals aged 12 and older. It is
also reported that between $19 to $29 billion dollars travel annually from the U.S. into Mexico to fuel
the operations of the drug trafficking criminal enterprise (Department of Homeland Security 2010).
Such high demand has reputedly led the U.S. to be labeled as the most important drug market (Payan
2006, Shirk 2011).

On December 1st, 2006, newly elected president of Mexico Felipe Calderon took office. Only
days after taking office, Calderon declared war on drug cartels. Wasting no time, Calderon dispatched
7,000 troops and police to the state of Michoacán to combat drug organizations. Forces of similar size
were shortly after sent to Tijuana on the northern border, and to the Pacific resort of Acapulco (The
Economist 2007). On January 19th, 2007, the government extradited four drug kingpins and a dozen
lesser figures to the United States for trial. Notably, amongst them was Osiel Cárdenas, the head of the
so-called “Gulf Cartel”, by far the most powerful drug gangster to be extradited to-date. It was clear that
Calderon’s shift in policy was taking action against the drug organizations. Calderon urged that the main
objective of the police in place was political control rather than combating crime. This is why Calderon
turned to the army (The Economist 2007). Some may note that Mr. Calderon’s war on drug gangs has
12

defined his presidency (WSJ 2009), while others note that data show that violence has increased sharply
under President Calderon (Rios and Shirk 2011).
Mexico’s close geographical proximity to the U.S. and their near 2,000 mile border serve as a
comparative advantage. This advantage increases the incentive for drug participation and the longing for
territorial dominance. In a passage from “The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars”, Payan 2006 notes:

“Thus, much of the drug trade along the border cannot be attributed to the morality or immorality
of the border or the good or ill intentions of those who participate in the production and
trafficking of illicit drugs, but the sheer economic incentives that the business itself offers and
the structural influencing border asymmetries such as differences in income levels,
unemployment, and low skill levels of many Mexican workers.”

As noted, the desire to maximize these economic incentives for the drug trafficking participants has led
to a recent Mexican cartel war over control of the major corridors into the U.S. In Ciudad Juárez, the
Sinaloa cartel has been in a constant violent war with the Juárez cartel in hope of capturing the Juárez
territory and its ports of entry into El Paso by controlling the individuals that take delivery and transport
the drugs.

It is understood that according to the “rational actor model” in the political science discipline,
and the “rational consumer model” in economics, individuals will engage in an activity as so long as the
expected benefit exceeds the expected cost (Becker 1968). Or, the expected benefit from engaging in a
crime is equal to the benefit that such crime may bring times the probability of receiving that benefit.
The cost of engaging in a crime is equal to the punishment tied to the crime times the probability of
being caught (Widner et al 2011). Thus, the actions of the cartels reflect their benefit from crime
13

exceeding the cost associated with it. The issue with Juárez, and Mexico at a larger scope, is the
ineffectiveness to punish those that engage in unlawful actions. According to surveys, between 70-80
percent crimes go unreported and only 7 percent of those reported crimes go to trial (Azaola and Bergam
2007).

Other reasons for the ineffectiveness are bribes and corruption. Cartels offer bribes to
government officials and law enforcement for “protection” from other cartels and or punishment from
the law. Those who accept such bribes are often compensated amounts that near or exceed annual
earnings (Widner et al 2011). Those who desire not to participate are often not given the option. They
are instead waged with the option of “plata o plomo”, meaning take the silver or take a bullet (Payan
2006).

An additional outcry of effectiveness is due to the presence of the Mexican military in regions of
Mexico, like Ciudad Juárez (Olson 2010). Military forces were deployed to high crime areas as a
temporary replacement for civilian police. By early 2010, there were 200 reported cases of human rights
violations by the military in Ciudad Juárez. Observers have argued that the ineffectiveness of the
military is due to their sole purpose of “presence patrol”. That is, dissuasive and reactive without many
strategic or intelligence based operations. Salazar and Olson (2011) also reports the limited authority of
the military as they have no explicit legal authority to carryout criminal investigations, interrogate
suspects, question witnesses, or gather forensic evidence at crime scenes. Although anti-crime efforts in
Ciudad Juárez have recently been turned over to federal police, the changeover is likely to take some
time.
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The drug war has led to many violent crimes and numerous homicides. Cartels often seek
violence as means to regulate competition and to adjust accounts among other cartels. In 2011, the
cumulative death toll for drug violence since 2006 reached a disturbing 50,000 deaths in Mexico. Such
homicides have not only targeted criminal participants. There have been numerous reports of homicides
that have targeted law enforcement at all levels, journalists, political officials, and innocent bystanders,
including Americans. Violence does not discriminate on any grounds. In 2009, reports indicate that the
mayor of Ciudad Juárez, Jose Reyes Ferriz, relocated himself and his family across the U.S. border in El
Paso, Texas after receiving numerous death threats. This was shortly after threats pressured Juárez
police chief, Roberto Orduña Cruz, to resign (Washington Valdez 2009).

Reports indicate that by 2010, Ciudad Juárez had become the most violent city in Mexico (Rios
and Shirk 2011). Additionally, some estimates have gone as far as labeling Ciudad Juárez as not only the
most dangerous city in Mexico, but also the world (El Paso times 2010, Consejo Ciudadano para la
Seguridad Publica y Justicia Penal 2010). The homicide rate is clearly reflective of such label. The
homicide rate, calculated using homicide data from La Pesidencia de Mexico (2012) and annual
population data from the Border Region Modeling Project at the University of Texas at El Paso (2012),
indicate a growth in violence in the last three years. The homicide rate for Ciudad Juárez increased from
10.001 per 100,000 residents in 2006 to 207.266 per 100,000 residents in 2010 (see Table 12).

In response to the escalated violence in border cities, the U.S. State Department issued the
following travel advisory concerning travel to Mexico:

U.S. travelers should be aware that the Mexican government has been engaged in an extensive
effort to counter transnational criminal organizations (TCO) which engage in narcotics
15

trafficking and other unlawful activities throughout Mexico. The TCOs themselves are engaged
in a violent struggle to control drug trafficking routes and other criminal activity. As a result,
crime and violence are serious problems throughout the country and can occur anywhere. U.S.
citizens have fallen victim to TCO activity, including homicide, gun battles, kidnapping,
carjacking and highway robbery… You should defer non-essential travel to the state of
Chihuahua. The situation in the state of Chihuahua, specifically Ciudad Juárez, is of special
concern. Ciudad Juárez has one of the highest murder rates in Mexico… Shootings have taken
place at busy intersections and at popular restaurants during daylight hours… Local police forces
suffer from a lack of funds and training, and the judicial system is weak, overworked, and
inefficient.

There are a number of costs that may be associated with homicides and crime. Crime may be
thought of as an anti-development phenomenon. Survey data show that crime and corruption are two of
the leading barriers to investment in a region (UNODC 2007). INEGI (2012) data indicate that foreign
direct investment (FDI) decreased in 2008 by 13.81 percent after having experienced a tremendous
growth of 56.52 percent the previous year. By 2009, Mexico registered consecutive negative growth and
the largest negative annual growth of the decade at $16.119 billion, down 40.6 percent. FDI seems to
have recovered by 2010. However, figures were boosted by the $5 billion takeover of the beer business
of Fomento Economico Mexico SAB by Deutsch Brewer Heineken. Excluding such single transaction
would again brand the percent change for 2010 in FDI as negative. It is also important to note that some
of the contraction in FDI may be attributable in combination to the Great Recession during that period
(see Table 13).
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Violence also hinders productivity and human capital and creates additional and unnecessary
government expenditures. Rios (2008) reports the economic costs generated by drug violence in Mexico
and notes negative externalities of corruption on aggregate investment and economic growth. Rios’
report estimates that the cost of violence to Mexico is equivalent to 1.07 billion dollars in both costs and
loses. Lodono and Guerrero (2002) estimate violence as a consequence to totals economic losses of 12.3
percent of the total Mexican GDP. The Congressional Research Service (2011) tells of the high cost
associated with combating the threat of drug trafficking. Between the fiscal year of 2008 and 2010, the
U.S. congress provided $1.5 billion for Mérida Initiative programs. The U.S. has since then reportedly
been of aid with an additional $425 million. Mexico invested $26.0 billion of its own resources on
security and public safety from 2008-2010 with an increase of approximately $3.6 billion since.

Violence in addition creates negative externalities because it instills fear thus impacts migration
and lowers quality of life. Violence in Mexico may be creating an “environment of insecurity” and such
environment promotes emigration from conflicted areas and from regions nearby. Although the recent
decrease in migration may be explained by the economic downturn in the US, homicide rates may in fact
help explain some of the increases in the migration flow (Meza-Gonzalez 2011). Meza-Gonzalez (2011)
tests the hypothesis regarding a positive relationship between insecurity and migration. The evidence
presented suggests a positive relationship between migration and insecurity. Results also indicate that
migration occurs in economically dynamic municipalities and although more likely, not necessarily in
only the richest.

Residents of Ciudad Juárez, and surrounding areas, may choose to emigrate in response to
insecurity. Although a majority may choose to migrate into other regions of Mexico, emigration to El
Paso is a strong possibility. El Paso is noted to be among the least violent cities in the United States
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(Olson 2010). Rankings by the CQ Press (2011) indicate that El Paso was the safest city in the United
States, with a population ≥ 500,000 from 2010-2011 and 2011-2012. Such rankings also rank El Paso
among the top three safest in the U.S. for the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 publications.
Rodolfo Rubio Salas, a professor and researcher at the Juárez campus of Colegio de la Frontera
Norte, in a recent interview (Alvarado 2011), states that individuals have fled Ciudad Juárez to the in
response to the recent spike in violence in the city. The demographer notes that his research methods
indicate that migrants fled to both the U.S. and the interior of the Mexico. Approximately 30,000 to
50,000 individuals have emigrated to the US and approximately 150,000 to the interior of Mexico.

Data reported by the Border Region Modeling Project (see table 14), are reflective of the outflow
in population in Ciudad Juárez. In 2010 alone, Ciudad Juárez experienced the largest negative net
migration with data going back as far as 1961. At the same time El Paso experienced positive, although
relatively small, net migration. It is important to note that individuals that do leave Ciudad Juárez have
many destination options. They may choose to migrate to other parts of Mexico. They may also choose
to relocate in other cities of the U.S. besides El Paso. At the same time, El Paso’s positive net migration
may also reflect inflow from other regions other than Mexico. Nonetheless, the insecurity in their home
town and the evident security across the border may have directed migration, at least some, from Ciudad
Juárez to El Paso.

Given the high levels homicide activity in Ciudad Juárez and high economic integration with El
Paso, regional assessment efforts are encouraged to asses potential impacts Ciudad Juárez homicides
may have on the El Paso economy. The following section outlines the data and methodology employed
to determine if such impacts exists.
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Chapter 3: Data and Methodology

3.1

DATA
Due to the close proximity and border-in-nature geography that El Paso and Ciudad Juárez share,

it is practical to include data for both the U.S. and Mexico. At the same time, the inclusion of homicides
may also prove useful in our assessment.

3.1.1 Dependent Variables

Because of the particular variables of interest and data availability, data gathered for the time
series analysis include variables that are recorded at a quarterly and monthly frequency. I use several
variables to capture the current stance of economic conditions in El Paso in addition to assessing the
potential impacts of the violence in Ciudad Juárez: El Paso metro business cycle index, employment,
and retail sales were analyzed as dependent variables. The El Paso metro business cycle index (MBCI)
shows the broad movements in the El Paso local economy. It summarizes movements in nonagricultural
employment, the unemployment rate, inflation-adjusted wages, and inflation-adjusted retail sales. Such
index is produced by the Reserve Bank of Dallas (Phillips and Cañas 2003) with sample period from
January 1980 to December 2010. El Paso nonagricultural total employment (EPEMP) is also analyzed as
a dependent variable. The data were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas with a sample
period from January 1980 to December 2010. El Paso inflation-adjusted retail sales (EPRR) as recorded
by the Reserve Bank of Dallas with sample period from 1980Q:1 to 2010Q:4 are also analyzed as a
dependent variable.

3.1.2 Homicides

The deaths occurred on suspicion of criminal rivalry (HOMI) as recorded at a monthly frequency
by Presidencia de la República of Mexico are to be explored as a potential explanatory variable. The
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sample period ranges from December 2006 to December 2010. The data are an aggregate of sub
categories including death by execution, death by confrontation, and assault to authority (see Glossary).
Presidencia de la República of México reports that homicides are defined as regards to Article 302 of the
Mexican Federal Criminal Code, which makes the indication that these are cases in the context of rivalry
between criminal groups. The sources responsible for generating the data base are comprised hereof:
Secretary of Defense (Navy), Public Safety and Federal Government (through Centro de Investigación y
Seguridad Nacional, CISEN), and by the Attorney General of the Republic (through Centro Nacional de
Planeación, Análisis e Información para el Combate a la Delincuencia, CENAPI).

The data base report indicates that each team member provides credible and reliable information
of its state deployments. It further states that data are verified to meet the criteria in the methodology.
Cases that lead to doubts, have gaps of information, or did not meet at least three of the criteria in the
methodology (See Glossary) are reserved in the section until the information allows them to be included
into the database or discarded. Furthermore, the reporting group has begun implementation of systematic
random procedure comparison of cases captured with the original source to ensure a higher quality of
data and minimize the possibility of errors attributable to the training of personnel responsible of
capturing or to the process of systematization of information. The sum of three month data was used to
allocate quarterly frequency of deaths occurred on suspicion of criminal rivalry (HOMI). The resulting
sample period ranges from 2006:Q4 to 2010:Q4. This was carried out for the analysis of El Paso real
retail sales (EPRR).
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3.1.3 Other Explanatory Variables

I use several other explanatory variables that would help explain fluctuations in the El Paso
economic variables of interest. These explanatory variables include: the U.S. industrial production
index, real exchange rate, indicador global de la actividad económica for Mexico, and El Paso
unemployment rate. The U.S. industrial production index (USIPI) measures the real output of the
manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas utilities industries. Such indices prove useful as they serve
as a measure of the overall “health” of the U.S. economy. This index is recorded by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and is employed with sample period from January 1980 to
December 2010 and from 1980:Q1 to 2010:Q4. Another explanatory variable is the real peso-to-dollar
exchange rate (REXR). This rate allows us to account for fluctuations in the value of the Mexican peso
relative the U.S. dollar. Such variable is recorded by Banco de Mexico with a sample period from
January 1980 to December 2010. The rate was also averaged using three monthly frequencies to obtain
the sample period 1980:Q1 to 2010:Q4. The Indicador global de la actividad económica in Mexico
(IGAE) is also included as an explanatory variable. Such indicator is regarded as Mexico’s monthly
GDP and may help indicate the evolution of economic activity for Mexico at a monthly frequency. It is
also particularly of interest because of it accounts, in part, for industrial activity including
manufacturing. This variable is recorded by Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía with as ample
period from January 1993 to December 2010. This indicator was also averaged using three monthly
frequencies to obtain the sample period from 1993:Q1 to 2010:Q4. The El Paso unemployment rate
(EPUR) is assessed as a potential explanatory variable as it may serve as an indicator of overall
economic conditions in El Paso. This variable is recorded by the Reserve Bank of Dallas with sample
period from 1990Q:1 to 2010Q:4.
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3.2

DATA ADJUSTMENTS

Adjustments for inflation of monetary values, EPRR and the MBCI because of its account of
retail sales, were carried out by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The measure of prices used was the
U.S. Consumer Price Index as prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics with 1978 as the base year.
The CPI measures the change in prices paid by urban consumers for a market basket of consumer goods
and services. It is primarily used as an economic indicator and as a means of adjusting current period
data for inflation (McCully et al 2007). The CPI was used for adjustment as opposed to the Personal
Consumption Expenditures Index that is produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The PCE,
which measures the change in prices paid for goods and services by the personal sector in the U.S.
national income and product account, is primarily used for macroeconomic analysis and forecasting
(McCully et al 2007). Research carried out by McCully et al (2007) shows that differences in growth
rates between the two measures may be explained by differences in index-number formulas and weights.
The larger weight affect was primarily explained by the larger relative weight for rent of shelter in the
CPI than in the PCE price index. Over time, both indices capture relatively parallel movements in prices
changes. The REXR was adjusted for inflation by the Banco de Mexico. Furthermore, the data were
deseasonalized by the reporting source. If this was not the case, it was done using the X-12-ARIMA
method as developed by the Census Bureau. This was done in hope of eliminating any cyclical seasonal
movements that may exist within the data and extracting the underlying trend component of the series
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998). Once the data were adjusted for seasonality and inflation, the data were
transformed using natural logs.

An important data adjustment was applied to the homicide data set. In hope of establishing longrun relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables, a number 1 was entered for homicide
observations prior December 2006 going back to 1980. Once the data were differenced and logged the
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result observation would be a number zero. This was done so that our regression estimates would not be
limited to only December 2006-to-present observation once the parameter for homicides was added. The
justification for such action is that the type of homicide violence reported in our data set began late
2006. Of course, some homicides may have occurred in Ciudad Juárez prior to 2006. However, not in
the volatile and large manner as present in our data set. Because the data are in log-differenced (change
in the percent change) form, small changes in the number of homicide prior to 2006 would have a
similar impact to our analysis relative adding a number 1 across observations for the same time period.

3.3 UNIT ROOT TESTS
The now-adjusted-data series were tested for stationarity to determine whether the underlying
stochastic process that generated the series could be assumed to be invariant with respect to time
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998). We want our series to exhibit stationary properties. A unit root test
enables a statistical assessment of the series to test if the series are stationary or not. Dickey-Fuller
Tests with GLS Detrending (DF-GLS) were performed as proposed by Eliott, Rothenberg, and Stock
(1996) with a constant and a linear time trend. Results of the unit root tests using log-level data are
recorded in Tables 1 and 5. Results indicate that the data fail to reject the null hypothesis that there
exists a unit root for each of the time series. This implies that each time series follows a unit root process
and therefore are not stationary in log-levels. Because the hypothesis of unit root cannot be ruled out,
estimation at log-level will yield spurious results. The data are then differenced in order to induce first
moment stationarity (Box and Jenkins 1976). Dickey-Fuller Tests with GLS Detrending (DF-GLS) were
performed on each of the log first-difference time series data. Results of the unit root tests using
differenced log-level data are recorded in Tables 2 and 6.Results indicate that the data reject the null
hypothesis at the 1% level respectively for all time series except USIPI and Homicides at the quarter
frequency and the monthly IGAE. However, the null hypothesis for quarter USIPI is rejected at the 10%
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level and at the 5% level for the quarter HOMI series. As a robustness check, Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) unit root test were performed for all the series. All results favored stationary properties.

3.4 OPTIMAL LAG STRUCTURE
Furthermore, before the regression estimation method is applied, it is necessary to find the lag
structure for all three models. In time-series models a substantial period of time may pass between the
economic decision-making process period and the impact of a change in a variable. Because this may be
the case in our analysis, lagged explanatory variables should be included explicitly in our models
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998). A series of cross correlation functions (CCFs) are estimated to
investigate a potential lag structure between the dependent variables and each of the independent
variables (Liu and Hanssens 1982, Coronado et al 2004). Lags of both the dependent and independent
variables are to be considered for specification as lagged explanatory variables. A cross correlation
function with lag k for a dependent variable y and an independent variable x is defined as follows:
for K= 0,1,2,…, and t=1,2,…,T.

3.5 RESIDUAL DIAGNOSTICS

Standard diagnostic testing of the residuals will determine if the functions should be expanded to
a transfer function model. That is to include autoregressive and moving-average components. In our
analysis, one may not rely solely on the Durbin Watson statistic. This being because when one or more
lagged endogenous variables are present the DW statistic will often be close to 2 even when the errors
are serially correlated (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998). The residual diagnostics in this study were carried
out with the analysis of the correlograms of residuals and Serial correlation LM tests as further
confirmation. Table 9 illustrates that the EMPCI was the only equation to exhibit undesired residual
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properties in both the correlogram of residuals and LM test. As mentioned above, the model was
augmented with ARMA parameters in response to this.

A general form for a transfer function ARIMA (p, d, q) model with one independent regressor (z)
is given below. The simplified model accounts for autoregressive movements noted by
moving average movements noted as

and

. Furthermore, we attempt to capture the remaining

movements with the explanatory variable as noted by

.

Furthermore, in our analysis our equation is modified with the objective of developing a linear transfer
function ARIMA model of the El Paso metro business cycle index. The models for both retail sales and
employment illustrated desirable residual properties in both the correlogram of residuals and LM test.
Because of this and the non statistical significance when included, AR MA terms were not included in
the analysis of retail sales while the analysis for employment included one month lag of itself.

3.6 REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Once the lag structure is identified, the equations for EPRR, EPEMP, and EPMBCI may be
specified and estimated. The latter was carried out using the least squares method. Such statistical
method aims to minimize the sum or squared residuals, that is:

Minimize
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Where

represents a basic single variable equation with intercept a and slope b. Y i is the

actual value of Y for observation i and corresponds to the value of X for that observation, while N is the
number of observations. As stated above, the aim of the least squares method is to choose values for a
and b which minimize the expression above or the sum of the squared difference between the actual
observations for Y and the estimated values .

The hypothesized relationships between the dependent variables and each of the El Paso
economic variables are as follow: The El Paso unemployment rate is expected to have a negative impact
on El Paso retail sales based on the convention that higher unemployment translates to less income and
ultimately less retail activity. The U.S. industrial production index is also expected to exhibit positive
properties on all three dependent variables. This being because such measure serves as a proxy for the
overall “health” of the U.S. economy. An increase in the real peso per dollar exchange rate index is
likely to decrease retail activity in El Paso as goods and services became more expensive for Mexican
commuters because of a devalued peso relative to the dollar. It is also likely to increase El Paso
employment as a devalued peso is likely to increase export oriented employment which has been shown
to impact El Paso employment positively. Mexican nationals may also seek employment in El Paso in
response to the difference in currency valuations. In return the exchange rate may also share positive
properties with the El Paso MBCI. The IGAE is likely to share a positive relationship with all three
variables. This is in response to ties of this indicator with industrial and maquiladora activity. An
increase in drug-related violence, as proxied by the number of homicides, is expected to cause an
increase in all three dependent variables. This is because of the likelihood that Mexican nationals would
rather commute to a much safe and location, El Paso, for retail and employment. At the same time,
American nationals are more likely to remain in El Paso as opposed to commuting into Juárez for the
same activities during high violence times.
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In the equation for (MBCI)
)
The expected algebraic signs are as follow:

In the equation for (EPRR)

The expected algebraic signs are as follow:

In the equation for (EMEMP)

The expected algebraic signs are as follow:

27

Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis

4.1 EL PASO METRO BUSINESS CYCLE INDEX

In the analysis of the impact of the Ciudad Juárez homicides on the El Paso metro business cycle
index, a total of four regressions are estimated (see Table 9). Each subsequent regression is meant to
illustrate the evolution of the initial specification as additional parameters are added. The first regression
includes the MBCI regressed against the more commonly expected potential explanatory variables and
their respective lags given our border region analysis. Although most coefficients display statistically
significant and expected coefficient signs, the regression rejects the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation present LM test. With the guidance from the correlogram of residuals, the second and third
equations include the addition of AR (3) and MA (2) terms. Such addition corrects for serial correlation
as displayed by the failure to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation LM test in equation 3. As
a robust check, correlograms of the residuals is also referenced. It may also be noted that across all three
regressions the signs and magnitudes of most coefficients remain the same implying uniformity. Once
satisfied with the specification and diagnostics, the homicide parameter is added in equation 4.

Final results indicate that changes in the El Paso metro business cycle index with a one month
lag have a positive and statistically significant impact on current period MBCI. The algebraic sign is
positive as expected since conditions in current period are likely to influence the following period in a
direct manner. The U.S. industrial production index too shares a positive and statistically significant
relationship with the MBCI at a contemporaneous level and three month lag. The Peso/Dollar exchange
rate index has an inverse and statistically significant relationship with the MBCI at an eight month lag.
Although contrary to the expected positive sign, a more expensive dollar to Mexican nationals may in
fact impact most of the activities underlined in the El Paso MBCI such as retail sales and employment in
a negative manner. The indicador global de la actividad económica for Mexico shares a direct and
statistically significant relationship with the El Paso’s MBCI at a contemporaneous level, one month lag,
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and seven month lag. As hypothesized, the positive algebraic sign confirms the economic linkages
between El Paso and Mexico’s economic activity.

Fluctuations in the number of Ciudad Juárez homicides share a direct correlation with the El
Paso MBCI. The coefficient for homicides with a four month lag, reported in first-difference-log, is
positive and has a 95 percent statistical significance. That’s is to say given our data set, an increase in
the number of Ciudad Juárez homicides four months back, leads to a statistically significant increase in
the current period El Paso metro business cycle index. The positive and significant correlation may
reflect the movement of economic activity north of the border in response to the insecurity to a much
safer area, El Paso.

4.2 EL PASO EMPLOYMENT

Now that the data have confirmed significant impacts on the El Paso metro business cycle index,
further analysis may be applied to some of the underlying components that make up such index. A
model is developed to assess the potential impacts of the Ciudad Juárez Homicides on El Paso
employment. A total of six regressions are estimated (see Table 10). Each subsequent regression is
meant to illustrate the evolution of the initial specification as additional parameters are added. The first
regression includes EPEMP regressed against the more commonly potential explanatory variables and
their respective lags given our border region analysis. Unlike in our MBCI analysis, the first regression
fails to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation LM test implying the non-presence of serial
correlation. As a robust check, a correlogram of residuals confirms the latter. The significance of the
coefficients and desired diagnostics led to the decision to move forward with such model specification.
Parameters for lags of homicides are then added in the equations 2,3,4,5, and 6. Once again, it is noted
that across all six regressions the signs and magnitudes of most coefficients remain the same implying
robustness in the results.
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As expected, the U.S. industrial production index shares a positive and statistically significant
relationship with EPEMP at a contemporaneous level, three month lag, and eight month lag. The
Peso/Dollar exchange rate has an inverse and statistically significant relationship with EPEMP at a 10
month lag. Although the expected sign was positive, a more expensive dollar to Mexican nationals may
decrease activities in El Paso thus negatively impacting EPEMP and outweighing any possible positive
impacts. The indicador global de la actividad económica for Mexico shares a direct and statistically
significant relationship with EPEMP at a contemporaneous level and seven month lag. As hypothesized,
the positive algebraic sign verifies the economic linkages between El Paso’s and Mexico’s economic
activity.

Fluctuations in the Ciudad Juárez homicides share a direct correlation with El Paso Employment.
The coefficients for homicides with monthly lags four through eight, reported in first-difference-log, are
positive and statistically significant. That’s is to say given our data set, an increase in the number of
Ciudad Juárez homicides four, five, six, seven, and eight months back, lead to a statistically significant
increase in current period El Paso Employment. The positive and statistically significant coefficients
may reflect the migration of individuals in the form of employment relocation to El Paso in response to
the insecurity in Ciudad Juárez. It may also reflect the migration of business activity which may
ultimately lead to new or more employment in El Paso.

4.3 EL PASO RETAIL SALES

Our analysis is now extended with focus on El Paso’s retail sales. A total of three regressions
are estimated (see Table 11). Each subsequent regression is meant to illustrate the evolution of the initial
specification as additional parameters are added. The first regression includes RRS regressed against the
more commonly potential explanatory variables and their respective lags given our border region
analysis. The first regression fails to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation LM test implying
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the non-presence of serial correlation. As a robust check, a correlogram of residuals confirms the latter.
The significance of the coefficients and desired diagnostics led to the decision to move forward with
such model specification. Parameters for lags of homicides are then added in the equations 2 and 3. It is
of value noting the robustness in the significance and magnitudes of the coefficients across all three
regressions.

Final results indicate that changes in the El Paso unemployment rate with a four quarter lag have
an inverse and statistically significant relationship with current period RRS. The unemployment rate is
generally an indicator of local economic conditions. Higher unemployment translates to less income and
ultimately less retail activity. As hypothesized, an increase in the El Paso unemployment rate leads to a
decrease in retail activity in El Paso. Also as expected, the U.S. industrial production index impacts RRS
in El Paso contemporaneously in a direct and significant manner. An increase in the Peso/Dollar
exchange rate decreases RRS in the same period significantly. This is expected as an increase in the real
peso per dollar exchange rate index will result in goods and services becoming more expensive for
Mexican cross-border commuters because of a devalued peso relative the dollar. The indicador global de
la actividad económica for Mexico shares an inverse and statistically significant relationship with RRS
at a three quarter lag. The findings are contrary to the hypothesized positive algebraic sign. One would
expect, because of the economic ties and border city geography, economic conditions in Mexico to
impact RRS in El Paso positively manner. Because the negative coefficient for IGAE was highly
unexpected, further options were explored. As a robustness check, the specification for RRS was
regressed with Mexico’s industrial production index in place of Mexico’s IGAE (INEGI 2012). The
coefficient for IGAE was confirmed as the coefficient for Mexico’s IPI was nearly synonymous in
magnitude and significance. The significant and negative sign may explain, given our data, that as
economic activity in Mexico improves, Mexico’s retail sector may increase availability and variety. This
may ultimately lead to the decision of Mexican nationals to engage in purchases south of the border as
opposed to incurring the commute cost of coming over to El Paso.
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Impacts to El Paso’s retail sector in response to fluctuations in the Ciudad Juárez homicides did
not yield conclusive results. One and four quarter lags were the most statistically significant, but failed
to validate at least at the 90% statistical significance. Despite the insignificance, the statistical signs are
worth exploring. One quarter lag depicts an inverse relationship with retail sales. That is, an increase in
Ciudad Juárez homicides one quarter back, leads to a decrease in El Paso’s current period RRS. The
impact seems to vary with respect to time. Homicides with a four quarter period lag have a-now-direct
impact on El Paso’s retail sector. The data show that an increase in homicides four quarters back
increases El Paso’s current period RRS. The net impact, or difference between the positive and negative
coefficients, illustrates a small but positive impact the Ciudad Juárez homicides have may have on the El
Paso economy. However, the negative coefficients seem to generally display higher statistical
significance. Note that no additional statistical tests were performed on this difference because of the
initial statistical insignificance. A regression including all lags for homicides, one through four, shows
the change in impact from negative to positive from lag two to three. Once again, the results ultimately
have to be ruled inconclusive because the coefficients did not meet the desired statistical significance.

The results presented here shed light on the believe that some individuals who would otherwise
hold employment in Ciudad Juárez or perhaps businesses that would be located there have relocated
activity in El Paso. Although believed to be small, there may also be a number of individuals who may
have to relocate their place of living across the border in El Paso. We would expect higher retail sales in
El Paso in response to the increase in violence and apparent decrease in activity in Ciudad Juárez (see
Table 17). The inconclusive results for retail sales are of incentive to further the research in the retail
sector as more data become readily available.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1 CONCLUSION AND REMARKS

Homicides, induced by the drug war, in Ciudad Juárez drastically increased beginning in 2007.
Few studies have been carried out which asses the economic impacts of crime and homicides (Rios
2008). Furthermore, the existing literature lacks regional assessment efforts. Because of geographical
proximity and close economic ties, this paper reviews some of the potential impacts the Ciudad Juárez
homicides may have on the El Paso regional economy. A time series data approach is employed to
assess potential impacts on factors including the El Paso metro business cycle index, El Paso
employment, and El Paso retail sales.

Border regions, like El Paso, face influence not only from U.S. business cycles but also national
business cycles in Mexico, as well as regional business patterns in Ciudad Juárez (Fullerton 2001). The
results presented in this paper, in combination with existing literature further confirm this trend. Given
our border region analysis, El Paso economic variables are regressed against both U.S. and Mexico
economic variables with statistically significant results. Once the number of neighboring city: Ciudad
Juárez homicides are accounted for in our El Paso economic analysis, results indicate the positive and
significant impacts of such violence across an international border.

Our empirical findings provide evidence of the positive impacts on the El Paso economy as a
result of high violence in its neighboring city of Ciudad Juárez. Furthermore, fluctuations in the number
of Ciudad Juárez homicides share a direct and statistically significant correlation with the El Paso metro
business cycle index. After the data confirmed significant impacts on the El Paso metro business cycle
index, further analysis is applied to some of the underlying components that make up such index.
Findings in this study indicate that fluctuations in the Ciudad Juárez homicides share a direct and
statistically significant correlation with El Paso employment. The empirical analysis for retail sales in El
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Paso analysis did not yield conclusive results. Despite the insignificance, the algebraic signs are worth
mention. The data show that homicides initially impact retail sales in El Paso negatively. The impact
then becomes positive past two quarter lags.

El Paso is noted to be among the least violent cities in the United States (Olson 2010). Rankings
by the CQ Press (2011) indicate that El Paso was the safest city in the United States, with a population ≥
500,000 from 2010-2011 and 2011-2012. Such rankings also rank El Paso among the top three safest in
the U.S. for the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 publications. The econometric results presented, existing
literature on violence, and current safety conditions in El Paso may leads us to assume that the insecurity
in Ciudad Juárez, with the number of homicides increasing by as much as 900 percent from one month
to the next, have directed some economic activity to the U.S. side of the border.

The reported results may also reflect the leakage of economic activity from the region of Ciudad
Juárez (see Table 17). Ciudad Juárez may well find itself in a state of economic downturn in response
not only to general economic conditions but also to high violence. Data from the Border Region
Modeling Project (BRMP) at the University of Texas- El Paso show that total Ciudad Juárez
employment and retail sales experienced noticeable contraction at around the time the violence began.
One might argue that this contraction can be explained in greater part by the U.S. economic recession,
which in turn affects Mexico and Ciudad Juárez because of its strong economic ties with the U.S.
However, given the positive and significant evidence of the impacts on the El Paso economy presented
in this paper, it may be safe to assume the negative impacts are grater in Ciudad Juárez itself. Further
research is encouraged to extend the research presented as more data become available and to include
analysis for Ciudad Juárez and other border regions experiencing the effects of the drug war.

34

References
Anonymous, "Deep in the heart of NAFTA." The Economist 26 Feb. 1998. Web. 1 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.economist.com/node/114197>.
Alvarado, Ramon. "Juárez demographer says 30,000 to 50,000 persons fled Juárez to the U.S. as a result
of drug-war violence since 2008." Mexodus 30 June 2011. Web. 2012.
<http://mexodus.borderzine.com/immigration/Juárez-demographer-says-30000-to-50000-persons-fledJuárez-to-the-u-s-as-a-result-of-drug-war-violence-since-2008/>
Ayer, Harry, and Ross Layton. "The Border Industry Program and the Impact of Expenditures on a U.S.
Border Community."Annals of Regional Science 8 (1974): 105-17. Web. 2012.
Azaola, Elena, and Marcelo Bergman. The Mexican Prison System. Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 2007. 91-114. Print.
Base de datos de fallecimientos. Presidencia de la República, 2011. Web. 30 Sept. 2011.
<http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/base-de-datos-de-fallecimientos/>.
Becker, Gary S. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." Journal of Political Economy 76
(1968): 169. Web. 28 Mar. 2012.
Border Crossing/Entry Data: Query Detailed Statistics. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, n.d. Web.
13 Mar. 2012. <http://www.bts.gov/programs/international/transborder/TBDR_BC/TBDR_BCQ.html>.
Border Region Modeling Project . Ed. Thomas M. Fullerton. The University of Texas at El Paso, 2012.
Web. 2012. <http://academics.utep.edu/Default.aspx?alias=academics.utep.edu/border>.
Borunda, Daniel. "Special report: 'Juárez deserves the title of most dangerous city in the world'." El
Paso Times 7 June 2010. Web. 2012. <http://www.elpasotimes.com/Juárez/ci_15241689>.
Box, George E., and Gwilym M. Jenkins. Time Series Analysis, Forecasting, and Control. 2nd ed. San
Francisco: Holden Day, 1976. Print.
Brookings Metro Monitor. N.p., 2012. Web. 2012.
<http://www.brookings.edu/research/interactives/metromonitor#overall>.
Cañas, Jesus. "A Decade of Change: El Paso's Economic Transition of the 1990s." El Paso Business
Frontier 1 (2002). Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas . Web. 31 Jan. 2012.
Cañas, Jesus, Roberto A. Coronado, and Keith Phillips. "Border Benefits from Mexican
Shoppers." Southwest Economy 11 (2006). Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas . Web. 31 Jan. 2012.
Cañas, Jesus, Roberto Coronado, Robert W. Gilmer, and Eduardo Saucedo. "The Impact of the
Maquiladora Industry on U.S. Border Cities." Growth and Change, Forthcoming (2011). Web. 2012.).

35

Chiquiar, Daniel, and Manuel Ramos-Francia. "Trade and Business-Cycle Synchronization: Evidence
from Mexican and U.S. Manufacturing Industries." North American Journal of Economics and
Finance 16 (2005): 187-216. Web.
Clark, Don P., Thomas M. Fullerton Jr., and Duane Burdorf. "Intra-Industry Trade Between the United
States and Mexico: 1993-1998." Estudios Economicos, El Colegio de Mexico 16.2 (2001): 167-83. Web.
2012.
Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Publica y Justicia Penal. N.p., 2010. Web. 2012.
<http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/>.
Coronado, Roberto A., and Keith R. Phillips. "Exported Retail Sales along the Texas-Mexico
Border." Journal of Borderland Studies 22.1 (2007): 19-38. Web. 31 Jan. 2012.
Coronado, Roberto, Keith R. Phillips, and Eduardo Saucedo. "Cross-Border Retail Activity Along the
Texas-Mexico Border."Unpublished Manuscript (2012). Print.
Coronado, Roberto, Thomas M. Fullerton, and Don P. Clark. "Short-run Maquiladora Employment
Dynamics in Tijuana." The Annals of Regional Science 38.4 Dec. (2004). Print.
"CQ Press City Crime Rankings." CQ Press. N.p., 2011. Web. 2012.
<http://www.cqpress.com/gethome.asp>.
De Cordoba, Jose, and Joel Millman. "Mexico Ramps Up Drug War With a Surge on Rio Grande." The
Wall Street Journal 24 Dec. 2009. Web. 28 Nov. 2012.
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126143123803700665.html>.
De la población de México 2005-2050. Consejo Naciaonal de Poblacion , n.d. Web. 12 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.conapo.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36&Itemid=234>.
Elliott, Graham, Thomas J. Rothenberg, and James H. Stock. "Efficient Tests for an Autoregressive Unit
Root." Econometrica64.4 July (1996): 813-36. Print.
Fiazo, Carlos. "México: una narcodemocracia?" Democracias bajo fuego. Drogas y poder en America
Latina (1998)
Fullerton Jr., Thomas M. "Currency Movements and International Border Crossings." International
Journal of Public Administration 23 (2000): 1113-23. Web. 2012.
Fullerton Jr., Thomas M., and David A. Schauer. "Regional Econometric Assessment of Aggregate
Water Consumption Trends." Australasian Journal of Regional Studies 7.2 (2001): 167-87. Web. 2012.
Fullerton Jr., Thomas M., and David A. Schauer. "Short-Run Maquiladora Employment
Dynamics." International Advances in Economic Research 7 (2001): 471-78. Web. 2012.
Fullerton, Jr., Thomas M. "Recent Trends in Border Economics." Social Science Journal 40 (2003):
583-92. Web. 31 Jan. 2012.
36

Fullerton Jr., Thomas M. "Empirical Evidence Regarding 9/11 Impacts on the Borderplex
Economy." Regional and Sectoral Economic Studies 7.2 (2007).
Fullerton, Jr., Thomas M. "Specification of a Borderplex Econometric Forecasting
Model." International Regional Science Journal 24.2 Apr. (2001): 245-60. Web. 31 Jan. 2012.
Gilmer, Robert W. "U.S.-Mexico Trade: Are we still Connected." El Paso Business Frontier 3 (2004).
Web. 2012.
Hanson, Gordon H. "U.S.–Mexico Integration and Regional Economies: Evidence from Border-City
Pairs." Journal of Urban Economics 50.2 Sept. (2001): 259-87. Web. 31 Jan. 2012.
"Índices de la producción industrial." Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía. N.p., n.d. Web.
2012. <http://www.inegi.gob.mx/>.
"Indice del tipo de cambio real del peso mexicano." Banco de México. N.p., n.d. Web. 2012.
<http://www.banxico.org.mx/SieInternet/consultarDirectorioInternetAction.do?accion=consultarCuadro
&idCuadro=CR60§or=2&locale=es>.
"Industrial Production." Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. N.p., n.d. Web. 2011.
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/default.htm>.
"Inversión extranjera directa." Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía. N.p., 2012. Web. 2012.
<http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/bie/default.aspx?idserPadre=1100003500700100#D1100003500700
100>.
Londono, Juan L., and Rodrigo Guerrero. "Violencia en America Latina: Epidemiologia y
Costos." Asalto al Desarrllo: Violencia en America Latina . (2002) Washington, D.C.: InterAmerican
Development Bank
McCully, C. P., Moyer, B. C., & Stewart, K. J. “A Reconciliation between the Consumer Price Index
and the Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index.” : 1-27. Web. 1 May 2012
Meza-Gonzalez, Liliana, and Michael W. Feil. "Public Insecurity and Emigration: The Mexican Csse."
UTSA Mexican Center, Mar. 2011. Web. 2012.
Mollick, André, Abigaíl Cortez-Rayas, and Rosa Olivas-Moncisvais. "Local labor markets in U.S.–
Mexican border cities and the impact of maquiladora production." The Annals of Regional Science 40.1
Mar. (2006): 95-116. Web. 30 Jan. 2012.
Olson, Eric L. "Shattered Dreams and Restoring Hope: Organized crime and violence on the U.S. Mexico border." Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 22 Feb. 2010. Web. 2012.
Patrick, Michael J., and William Renforth. "The Effects of the Peso Devaluation on Cross-Border
Retailing." Journal of Borderlands Studies 11.1 (1996). Web. 2012.
Payan, Tony. The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars. Westport,Conneticut: Praeger Security International,
2006. Print.
37

Phillips, Keith R., and Jesus Cañas. "Regional Business Cycle Intergration Along the US-Mexico
Border." The Annals of Regional Science. 24.1 (2008). Web. 2012.
Phillips, Keith R., and Jesus Cañas. "Texas Border Business Cycles Indexes." El Paso Business
Frontier 1 (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas . Web. 31 Jan. 2012
Pindyck, Robert S., and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. "Econometric Models and Economic Forecasts." (1997).
Print.
"Regional Data." Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. N.p., 2011. Web. 2011.
<http://www.dallasfed.org/research/econdata/index.cfm>.
Resa Nestares, Carlos. "El Valor de las Exportaciones Mexicanas de Drogas Illegales, 19612000." Coleccion de Documentos Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (2003). Print.
Rios, Viridiana. "Evaluating the Economic Impact of Mexico's Drug Trafficking Industry." Department
of Government Harvard University (2008): 1-22. Print.
Rios, Viridiana, and David A. Shirk. "Drug Violence in Mexico: Data Analysis Through 2010." TransBorder Institute. The University of San Diego, Feb. 2011. Web. 2012.
Salazar, Miguel R., and Eric L. Olson. "A Profile of Mexico's Major Organized Crime
Groups." Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2011). Print.
Seelke, Clare R., and Kristin M. Finklea. "U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Merida initiative
and Beyond."Congressional Research service 15 Aug. 2011. Web. 27 Nov. 2012. <www.crs.gov>.
Shirk, David A. "The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat." Council on Foreign
Relations. Council Special Report No. 60, Mar. 2011. Web. 2012. <http://www.cfr.org/>.
"Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de México: Indicador Global de la Actividad Economica." Instituto
Nacional de Estadística y Geografía. N.p., Dec. 2010. Web. 2011.
Sprinkle, Richard L. Project link: An Investigation Of Employment linkages Between Cd. Juárez and El
Paso. N.p.: The Association, 1986. 1-54. University of Texas at El Paso. Web. 31 Jan. 2012.
State & County Quick Facts. U.S. Census Bureau, Jan. 2012. Web. 12 Mar. 2012.
<http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48141.html>.
"State Exports by NAICS Database." World Institute of Strategic Economic Research . N.p., n.d. Web.
28 July 2012. <http://www.wisertrade.org/home/index.jsp>.
“The Tough Get Going." The Economist. N.p., 25 Jan. 2007. Web. 2012.
<http://www.economist.com/node/8593011>.
Totty, Michael and Patrick Barta, “Mexican Shoppers Return to Texas, but Border Retailing isn’t the
Same.”, The Wall Street Journal, Texas Journal, 1997, T1-T3.
38

"Travel Warning for Mexico." U.S. Department of State. N.p., 2010. Web. 2012.
<http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_970.html#safety>.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, . "Crime and Development in Central America." May
(2007). Web. 29 Mar. 2012.
"United States-Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study." U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
N.p., June 2010. Web. 2012. <http://www.ice.gov/cornerstone/cps-study.htm>.
United States International Trade Commission . N.p., n.d. Web. 2012. <http://www.usitc.gov/>.
"U.S. Exports & Imports Trade Activity." Texas Center for Border Economic and Enterprise
Development. Texas A&M International University, 2012. Web. 2012.
<http://texascenter.tamiu.edu/texcen_services/trade_activity.asp>.
Washington Valdez, Diana. "After threats, Juárez mayor in El Paso." The El Paso Times 24 Feb. 2009.
Web. 2012. <http://www.elpasotimes.com/newupdated/ci_11770841>.
Widner, Benjamin, Manuel L. Reyes-Loya, and Carl E. Enomoto. "Crimes and Violence in Mexico:
Evidence from Panel Data."The Social Science Journal 48 (2011). Web. 1 Feb. 2012.

39

Glossary
Death by Assault to Authority - Attacks by criminal groups against the authority at any of the three
levels of government without a chance to respond. The goal of such actions is to affect the
institution or intimidate the security staff.
 The attack is made against:
o Real estate property owned by the government (federal, state, and municipal)
o Real estate property used by the authority.
o Checkpoints.
o Convoy for monitoring patrols, deterrence, and prevention.
o Uniformed officers and or marked vehicles.
 No armed response by the authorities.
 Employment of heavy caliber firearms, grenades, and or explosives.
 There is evidence that establishes the attackers as members of a criminal group.
 Can be one or more aggressors.
 In retaliation of action by authority.

Death by Confrontation - Acts of sporadic and isolated of violence, crimes, disturbances of social peace
and order against authority, by groups of criminal organizations. Events in which police have to
make use of firearms to enforce the law. Events between members of criminal groups, caused by
antagonism with other groups or differences within the same group (internal adjustment).
 Offenders are at least three, or being less used high destructive weapons exclusively for the
army.
 Criminals violently resist authority, either through the use of weapons or any other lethal
action.
 When offenders cannot be subdued or controlled quickly or instantly with only one tactical
action.
 A chase during a confrontation is not considered unless it presents the conditions described
above.
 When the authority responds to an assault regarding the exchange of fire.
 In extraordinary cases, homicides occurred in prisons are considered.
 The confrontation is against any of the three spheres of government (Federal, State, and
municipal)
 The confrontation is between criminal groups.

Death by Execution - The intentional murder where the victim and or perpetrator is presumably a
member of a criminal group.
 Victim has impacts of long-firearm and or short caliber.
 Victims show signs of torture and severe injuries.
 Victim’s remains were found after execution.
 Materials found typically connected to mode of operation of criminal groups gas, blankets,
tape, etc.
 Circumstances:
40



o Alleged relating to criminal group,
o Victim was previously deprived of freedom,
o Was performed in ambush or pursuit.
Criminal messages were retrieved.

NOTE: In extraordinary cases, homicides occurred in prisons are considered
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Appendix

Table 1: DF-GLS Unit Root Test [w/ Constant & Linear Time Trend]
DF-GLS
Frequency: Monthly
Levels (in logs)
El Paso Employment
El Paso Metro Business Cycle Index
U.S. Industrial Production Index
Real Exchange Rate Peso-Dollar
Indicador Global de la Actividad
Económica
Mexico Industrial Production Index
Homicides, Cd. Juárez

t-Stat

# of
Observations

Max. # of
Lags

1% level

Test Critical Value
5% level

10% level

-1.1540
-1.9174
-2.0854
-2.3754

248
367
367
370

15
16
16
16

-3.4648
-3.4767
-3.4767
-3.4770

-2.9204
-2.8966
-2.8966
-2.8960

-2.6232
-2.5815
-2.5815
-2.5805

-2.1960
-1.4963
-1.9761

212
215
47

14
14
10

-3.4612
-3.4615
-3.7700

-2.9276
-2.9270
-3.1900

-2.6358
-2.6347
-2.8900

Notes: The monthly data are in levels (in logs). Data for El Paso Employment corresponds to the period
1980:01 – 2010:12; for U.S. Industrial production Index corresponds to period 1980:01 – 2010:12; for
the Real Peso/Dollar exchange rate corresponds to period 1980:01 – 2010:12; for Indicador Global De la
Actividad Economica corresponds to period 1993:01 – 2010:12; for Mexico Industrial Production Index
corresponds to period 1993:01 – 2010:12; for El Paso Real Retail Sales correspond to period 1980:01 –
2010:12; for Ciudad Juárez Homicides corresponds to period 2006:12 – 2010:12. When the calculated tstat > t-critical we may rejects the null hypothesis that there exists a unit root at each given confidence
(in favor of stationary properties).

Table 2: DF-GLS Unit Root Test [w/ Constant & Linear Time Trend]
DF-GLS
Frequency: Monthly
1st Difference (in logs)
El Paso Employment
El Paso Metro Business Cycle Index
U.S. Industrial Production Index
Real Exchange Rate Peso-Dollar
Indicador Global de la Actividad
Económica
Mexico Industrial Production Index
Homicides, Cd. Juárez

t-Stat

# of
Observations

Max. # of
Lags

1% level

Test Critical Value
5% level

10% level

-7.2809
-4.4885
-6.0717
-15.1045

248
367
367
370

15
16
16
16

-3.4648
-3.4767
-3.4767
-3.4770

-2.9204
-2.8966
-2.8966
-2.8960

-2.6232
-2.5815
-2.5815
-2.5805

-2.2339
-4.3461
-10.9125

209
211
47

14
14
10

-3.4609
-3.4611
-3.7700

-2.9282
-2.9278
-3.1900

-2.6368
-2.6361
-2.8900

Notes: The monthly data are in 1st difference (in logs). When the calculated t-stat > t-critical we may
rejects the null hypothesis that there exists a unit root at each given confidence (in favor of stationary
properties).
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Table 3: ADF Unit Root Test [w/ Constant & Linear Time Trend]
ADF
Frequency: Monthly
Levels(in logs)
El Paso Employment
El Paso Metro Business Cycle Index
U.S. Industrial Production Index
Real Exchange Rate Peso-Dollar
Indicador Global de la Actividad
Económica
Mexico Industrial Production Index
Homicides, Cd. Juárez

t-Stat

# of
Observations

Max. # of
Lags

1% level

Test Critical Value
5% level

10% level

-1.9944
-1.9125
-1.8007
-2.6781

248
367
367
370

15
16
16
16

-3.9954
-3.9832
-3.9832
-3.9830

-3.4280
-3.4221
-3.4221
-3.4220

-3.1373
-3.1338
-3.1338
-3.1338

-2.1957
-1.4971
-3.7232

212
215
48

14
14
10

-4.0019
-4.0013
-4.1611

-3.4311
-3.4308
-3.5063

-3.1392
-3.1390
-3.1830

Notes: As a robustness check, I also performed the ADF unit root test for all time series to obtain the
same results as with the DF-GLS unit root tests.

Table 4: ADF Unit Root Test [w/ Constant & Linear Time Trend]
ADF
Frequency: Monthly
1st Difference (in logs)
El Paso Employment
El Paso Metro Business Cycle Index
U.S. Industrial Production Index
Real Exchange Rate Peso-Dollar
Indicador Global de la Actividad
Económica
Mexico Industrial Production Index
Homicides, Cd. Juárez

t-Stat

# of
Observations

Max. # of
Lags

1% level

Test Critical Value
5% level

10% level

-7.3905
-4.8825
-6.4223
-15.5463

248
367
367
370

15
16
16
16

-3.9954
-3.9832
-3.9832
-3.9830

-3.4280
-3.4221
-3.4221
-3.4220

-3.1373
-3.1338
-3.1338
-3.1338

-8.1857
-14.0563
-10.8944

212
214
47

14
14
10

-4.0019
-4.0015
-4.1657

-3.4311
-3.4309
-3.5085

-3.1392
-3.1391
-3.1842

Notes: As a robustness check, I also performed the ADF unit root test for all time series to obtain the
same results as with the DF-GLS unit root tests.
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Table 5: DF-GLS Unit Root Test [w/ Constant & Linear Time Trend]
DF-GLS
Frequency: Quarterly
Levels (in logs)
El Paso Employment
El Paso Real Retail Sales
U.S. Industrial Production Index
Real Exchange Rate Peso-Dollar
Indicador Global de la Actividad
Económica
Mexico Industrial Production Index
Homicides, Cd. Juárez

t-Stat

# of
Observations

Max. #
of Lags

1% level

Test Critical
Value 5% level

10% level

-1.4609
-1.9420
-1.8130
-3.4680

82
123
121
120

11
12
12
12

-3.6484
-3.5524
-3.5548
-3.5560

-3.0876
-3.0070
-3.0090
-3.0100

-2.7940
-2.7170
-2.7190
-2.7200

-2.6430
-2.8185
-1.3645

70
70
15

11
11
3

-3.6940
-3.6940
-3.7700

-3.1260
-3.1260
-3.1900

-2.8300
-2.8300
-2.8900

Notes: The quarterly data are in levels (in logs). Data for El Paso Employment corresponds to the period
1980:Q1 – 2010:Q4; for U.S. Industrial production Index corresponds to period 1980:Q1 – 2010:Q4; for
the Real Peso/Dollar exchange rate corresponds to period 1980:Q1 – 2010:Q4; for Indicador Global De
la Actividad Economica corresponds to period 1993:Q1 – 2010:Q4; for Mexico Industrial Production
Index corresponds to period 1993:Q1 – 2010:Q4; for El Paso Real Retail Sales correspond to period
1980:01 – 2010:12; for Ciudad Juárez Homicides corresponds to period 2006:Q4 – 2010:Q4. When the
calculated t-stat > t-critical we may rejects the null hypothesis that there exists a unit root at each given
confidence (in favor of stationary properties).

Table 6: DF-GLS Unit Root Test [w/ Constant & Linear Time Trend]
DF-GLS
Frequency: Quarterly
1st Difference (in logs)
El Paso Employment
El Paso Real Retail Sales
U.S. Industrial Production Index
Real Exchange Rate Peso-Dollar
Indicador Global de la Actividad
Económica
Mexico Industrial Production Index
Homicides, Cd. Juárez

t-Stat

# of
Observations

Max. #
of Lags

1% level

Test Critical
Value 5% level

10% level

-5.9976
-5.8492
-2.9463
-8.3771

82
121
122
122

11
12
12
12

-3.6484
-3.5548
-3.5536
-3.5536

-3.0876
-3.0090
-3.0080
-3.0080

-2.7940
-2.7190
-2.7180
-2.7180

-6.2069
-4.4150
-3.2959

70
70
13

11
11
3

-3.6940
-3.6940
-3.7700

-3.1260
-3.1260
-3.1900

-2.8300
-2.8300
-2.8900

Notes: The quarterly data are in 1 st difference (in logs). When the calculated t-stat > t-critical we may
rejects the null hypothesis that there exists a unit root at each given confidence (in favor of stationary
properties).
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Table 7: ADF Unit Root Test [w/ Constant & Linear Time Trend]
ADF
Frequency: Quarterly
Levels(in logs)
El Paso Employment
El Paso Real Retail Sales
U.S. Industrial Production Index
Real Exchange Rate Peso-Dollar
Indicador Global de la Actividad
Económica
Mexico Industrial Production Index
Homicides, Cd. Juárez

t-Stat

# of
Observations

Max. #
of Lags

1% level

Test Critical
Values 5% level

10% level

-1.9762
-4.4663
-1.4862
-4.0154

82
123
121
120

11
12
12
12

-4.0738
-4.0343
-4.0356
-4.0363

-3.4655
-3.4467
-3.4473
-3.4476

-3.1593
-3.1483
-3.1487
-3.1489

-1.7719
-2.7706
-1.0329

71
70
15

11
-11
3

-4.0925
-4.0945
-4.7283

-3.4743
-3.4753
-3.7597

-3.1644
-3.1650
-3.3249

As a robustness check, I also performed the ADF unit root test for all time series to obtain the same
results as with the DF-GLS unit root tests.

Table 8: ADF Unit Root Test [w/ Constant & Linear Time Trend]
ADF
Frequency: Quarterly
1st Difference (in logs)
El Paso Employment
El Paso Real Retail Sales
U.S. Industrial Production Index
Real Exchange Rate Peso-Dollar
Indicador Global de la Actividad
Económica
Mexico Industrial Production Index
Homicides, Cd. Juárez

t-Stat

# of
Observations

Max. #
of Lags

1% level

Test Critical
Values 5% level

10% level

-5.9396
-11.8084
-5.7225
-8.3768

82
122
121
122

11
12
12
12

-4.0738
-4.0349
-4.0356
-4.0349

-3.4655
-3.4470
-3.4473
-3.4470

-3.1593
-3.1485
-3.1487
-3.1485

-6.1193
-4.4725
-3.0375

70
70
13

11
11
3

-4.0945
-4.0945
-4.8864

-3.4753
-3.4753
-3.8289

-3.1650
-3.1650
-3.3629

As a robustness check, I also performed the ADF unit root test for all time series to obtain the same
results as with the DF-GLS unit root tests.
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Table 9: Regression Results - El Paso Metro Business Cycle Index
Regression
Estimates
(2)

El Paso MBCI
(1)
Explanatory variable:
Constant term
El Paso MBCI (-1)
U.S. Ind. Prod. Index
U.S. Ind. Prod. Index (-3)
Peso/Dollar Exchange Rate (-8)
Indicador Glob. Activ. Econ.
IGAE (-1)
IGAE (-7)

(3)

(4)

0.000238 *
(0.000126)
0.631774***
(0.048657)
0.045538***
(0.017801)
0.032975*
(0.018206)
-0.003504
(0.002911)
0.026599***
(0.007022)
0.018826***
(0.007056)
0.013399**
(0.006227)

0.000317*
(0.000173)
0.601990***
(0.051169)
0.042883***
(0.016982)
0.034674**
(0.017018)
-0.006842***
(0.002594)
0.022397***
(0.006855)
0.017238***
(0.006906)
0.012790**
(0.005908)
0.330100***
(0.068971)

0.000197*
(0.000118)
0.708090***
(0.055652)
0.045120***
(0.014952)
0.026473*
(0.015441)
-0.005967***
(0.002496)
0.019021***
(0.006651)
0.016347***
(0.006659)
0.008282
(0.005266)
0.284408***
(0.073854)
-0.308887***
(0.084285)

0.000169
(1.482719)
0.713103***
(0.053837)
0.046715***
(0.014600)
0.026894*
(0.015089)
-0.005978***
(0.002463)
0.018945***
(0.006569)
0.016525***
(0.006579)
0.009195*
(0.005187)
0.286277***
(0.074276)
-0.335025***
(0.082998)
0.000547**
(0.000268)

208
0.649285
0.63701
0.001602
0.000513
1047.774
52.89487
0
2.002257

205
0.68706
0.674287
0.001526
0.000456
1043.231
53.78973
0
1.85192

205
0.709471
0.696062
0.001474
0.000423
1050.848
52.91007
0
1.952086

205
0.715443
0.700775
0.001462
0.000415
1052.976
48.77608
0
1.934967

8.416484
16.36726
0.0003
0.0003

0.61741
1.302903
0.5404
0.5213

0.46921
0.996486
0.6262
0.6076

Reject

Fail to Reject

Fail to Reject

Autoregressive Terms AR(3)
Moving Average Terms MA(2)
Juárez Homicides (-4)

Number of Observation:
R-squared:
Adjusted R-squared:
S.E. of Regression:
Sum squared resid:
Log Likelihood:
F-statistic:
Prob(F-stat):
Durbin-Watson Stat:

Breusch- Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test
F-statistic
11.25853
Obs*R-squared
21.23894
Prob. F(2,198)
0
Prob. Chi-Square(2)
0
Ho: NO SERIAL
CORRELATION
Reject

Note: The data are regressed in First Difference-Logs. *** indicates 99 percent statistical significance,
**indicates 95 percent statistical significance, and * indicates 90 percent statistical significance. A total
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of four regressions are estimated. Each subsequent regression is meant to illustrate the evolution of the
initial specification as additional parameters are added as well as a robustness-check. The BreuschGodfrey Serial Correlation LM tests are reported as the Durbin-Watson statistic may prove limited if
there are lagged dependent variables on the right had side of the regression.

Table 10: Regression Results - El Paso Employment
El Paso Employment

Regression Estimates
(3)
(4)

(1)

(2)

Constant term

0.000697***
(0.000234)

0.000671***
(0.000245)

El Paso Employment (-1)

-0.166729***
(0.064731)

U.S. Ind. Prod. Index

(5)

(6)

Explanatory variable:
0.000581**
(0.000248)
0.167189***
(0.064881)

0.000506**
(0.000251)

0.000429*
(0.000251)

-0.162934***
(0.064894)

0.000617***
(0.000245)
0.160218***
(0.064549)

-0.172265***
(0.064639)

-0.182991***
(0.064268)

0.094979***
(0.034440)

0.097266**
(0.034546)

0.103739***
(0.034541)

0.107535***
(0.034726)

0.115079***
(0.034842)

0.129805***
(0.035228)

U.S. Ind. Prod. Index (-3)

0.074246**
(0.036470)

0.074560**
(0.036487)

0.071051**
(0.036336)

0.072079**
(0.036342)

0.076095**
(0.036244)

0.082020**
(0.036033)

U.S. Ind. Prod. Index (-8)

0.077669**
(0.033811)

0.078552 **
(0.033840)

0.078168 **
(0.033652)

0.079259***
(0.033661)

0.08109***
(0.033516)

0.072864**
(0.033447)

Peso/Dollar Exchange Rate (-3)

-0.008755
(0.005888)

-0.008871
(0.005892)

-0.009693*
(0.005791)

-0.017346***
(0.005929)

-0.017454***
(0.005933)

-0.009293
(0.005862)
0.016891***
(0.005908)

-0.009078
(0.005835)

Peso/Dollar Exchange Rate (-10)

-0.009255
(0.005863)
0.016837***
(0.005909)

-0.016370***
(0.005888)

-0.016294***
(0.005836)

IGAE

0.022040*
(0.012402)

0.022214*
(0.012409)

0.020933*
(0.012360)

0.021641*
(0.012376)

0.023816**
(0.012383)

0.022031*
(0.012302)

IGAE (-7)

0.025492**
(0.012598)

0.025884**
(0.012611)

0.026960**
(0.012555)

0.025778**
(0.012603)

0.025379**
(0.012545)

0.025990**
(0.012438)

0.000579
(0.000636)

0.00108
(0.000691)

0.001251*
(0.000710)

0.001191*
(0.000708)

0.001268*
(0.000703)

0.001240*
(0.000690)

0.001601**
(0.000772)

0.001860***
(0.000783)

0.001832***
(0.000776)

0.000744
(0.000714)

0.001357*
(0.000791)

0.001713**
(0.000808)

0.001220*
(0.000717)

0.001981***
(0.000796)

Juárez Homicides (-4)
Juárez Homicides (-5)
Juárez Homicides (-6)
Juárez Homicides (-7)
Juárez Homicides (-8)

Number of Observation:
R-squared:
Adjusted R-squared:
S.E. of Regression:
Sum squared resid:
Log Likelihood:
F-statistic:
Prob(F-stat):
Durbin-Watson Stat:

0.001528**
(0.000721)
208
0.225736
0.19461
0.00322
0.002063
903.0531
7.252281
0
1.957297

208
0.22896
0.193913
0.003221
0.002055
903.4871
6.532898
0
1.967547

208
0.241404
0.202896
0.003203
0.002021
905.1792
6.269016
0
1.982142

Breusch- Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test
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208
0.245577
0.203237
0.003203
0.00201
905.7529
5.800105
0
1.986728

208
0.256617
0.21087
0.003187
0.001981
907.286
5.609523
0
2.019285

208
0.27342
0.224732
0.003159
0.001936
909.6638
5.615722
0
2.02088

F-statistic
Obs*R-squared
Prob. F(2,198)
Prob. Chi-Square(2)
Ho: NO SERIAL CORRELATION

0.765046
1.603077
0.4667
0.4486
Fail to Reject

0.75803
1.596523
0.47
0.4501
Fail to Reject

0.839426
1.77549
0.4335
0.4116
Fail to Reject

1.056143
2.240326
0.3498
0.3262
Fail to Reject

1.06937
2.2797
0.3452
0.3199
Fail to Reject

1.409065
3.008811
0.2469
0.2221
Fail to Reject

Note: The data are regressed in First Difference-Logs. *** indicates 99 percent statistical significance,
**indicates 95 percent statistical significance, and * indicates 90 percent statistical significance. A total
of six regressions are estimated. Each subsequent regression is meant to illustrate the evolution of the
initial specification as additional parameters are added as well as a robustness-check. The BreuschGodfrey Serial Correlation LM tests are reported as the Durbin-Watson statistic may prove limited if
there are lagged dependent variables on the right had side of the regression.
Table 11: Regression Results - El Paso Real Retail Sales
El Paso Real Retail Sales
(1)
Explanatory variable:
Constant term
El Paso Unemp. Rate (-4)
U.S. Ind. Prod. Index
Peso/Dollar Exchange
Rate

IGAE (-3)

Regression Estimates
(2)
(3)

Robust
(4)

(5)

0.004695
(0.003575)
-0.103888*
(0.059329)
0.726674***
(0.234231)

0.005695
(0.003730)
-0.097319*
(0.059780)
0.697489***
(0.236431)

0.004446
(0.003906)
-0.098796*
(0.059731)
0.779454***
(0.248397)

0.003879
(0.003841)
-0.099830*
(0.059641)
0.819264***
(0.249915)

0.004295
(0.004213)
-0.098775
(0.061142)
0.814867***
(0.275192)

-0.104569**
(0.046083)

-0.102188**
(0.046189)

-0.102747**
(0.046142)

-0.116889***
(0.045287)

-0.102566**
(0.047124)

-0.451375***
(0.187894)

-0.470153***
(0.189085)
-0.00747
(0.007878)

-0.474222***
(0.188919)
-0.007267
(-0.923114)

Juárez Homicides (-1)

Juárez Homicides (-4)

0.008701
(0.008169)

MXIPI
(-3)

-0.442842***
(0.172729)
-0.007521
(0.007865)
0.007638
(0.008155)

IGAE
(-3)
Homicide
Homi
.(-1)
Homi.
(-2)
Homi.
(-3)
Homi.
(-4)

Number of Observation:
R-squared:
Adjusted R-squared:
S.E. of Regression:
Sum squared resid:
Log Likelihood:
F-statistic:

68
0.278164
0.232333
0.02663
0.044677
152.6573
6.069351

68
0.288481
0.231101
0.026651
0.044039
153.1468
5.027515

68
0.301472
0.232764
0.026623
0.043235
153.7733
4.387745
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68
0.304283
0.235852
0.026569
0.043061
153.9104
4.446565

-0.500356***
(0.196893)
-0.001488
(0.008247)
-0.008499
(0.008262)
-0.002393
(0.008537)
0.005414
(0.008654)
0.009907
(0.008641)
68.000000
0.307974
0.200591
0.027175
0.042832
154.091300
2.867989

Prob(F-stat):
Durbin-Watson Stat:

0.000339
1.919882

0.000625
1.925633

0.000952
1.955463

0.000856
1.976430

0.007208
1.942143

Breusch- Godfrey Serial
Correlation LM Test
F-statistic
Obs*R-squared
Prob. F()
Prob. Chi-Square(2)
Ho: NO SERIAL
CORRELATION

0.013349
0.029749
0.9867
0.9852

0.015898
0.036016
0.9842
0.9822

0.045192
0.104012
0.9558
0.9493

0.091318
0.209847
0.9129
0.9004

0.036179
0.087751
0.964500
0.957100

Fail to Reject

Fail to Reject

Fail to Reject

Fail to Reject

Fail to Reject

Note: The data are regressed in First Difference-Logs. *** indicates 99 percent statistical significance,
**indicates 95 percent statistical significance, and * indicates 90 percent statistical significance. A total
of three regressions are estimated. Each subsequent regression is meant to illustrate the evolution of the
initial specification as additional parameters are added as well as a robustness-check. Regression 4 is
added as a robustness check where the IGAE is substituted with the Mexico Industrial Production Index
from (INEGI). Regression 5 is also a robustness check where all lags for Homicides, up to one year
back, are added. The Breusch- Godfrey Serial Correlation LM tests are reported as the Durbin-Watson
statistic may prove limited if there are lagged dependent variables on the right had side of the regression.

Table 12: Ciudad Juárez Homicide rate
Juárez

Homicide rate

Year

Population

Homicides

per 100,000

2007

1,359,787

136

10.0

2008

1,384,102

1,332

96.2

2009

1,377,849

2,230

161.8

2010

1,321,004

2,738

207.3

Notes: The homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants was calculated by first dividing the annual population
by 100,000. Then, I divided the resulting number by the number of homicides for that year.
Source: Homicide data from La Presidencia de la Republica: México and Population data from The
Border Region Modeling Project (UTEP).
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Table 13: Mexico’s Foreign Direct Investment
Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

FDI (billions, $)
13.929
18.110
29.926
23.883
18.655
24.827
24.407
20.119
31.492
27.140
16.119
20.709
19.554

% Change
30.0%
65.2%
-20.2%
-21.9%
33.1%
-1.7%
-17.6%
56.5%
-13.9%
-40.6%
28.5%
-5.6%

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI).

Table 14: Ciudad Juárez/ El Paso Net Migration
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

Ciudad Juárez Net
Migration
-11,265
-25,935
-27,554
2,627
3,951
17,563
4,615
4,026
373
-26,969
-73,990

El Paso Net Migration
-4,793
-6,313
-5,828
-3,936
-2,506
-3,904
2,170
-2,907
1,061
3,397
2,045

Notes: Net migration is the calculated difference between Immigration and emigration. A positive value
implies a higher number of individuals coming in while a negative implies a higher number going out.
Source: The Border Region Modeling Project (UTEP).
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Table 15: Descriptive Statistics (Monthly)

Variable
(Frequency: Monthly)
Metro Business Cycle
Index
El Paso Employment
U.S. Ind. Produc. Index
Peso/Dollar Exchange Rate
I.G.A.E.
MX. Ind. Prod. Index
Ciudad Juárez Homicides

Mean

Median

Maximum

Minimum

Std. Dev.

# of obs.

152.131
248.304
73.543
85.272
98.1
98.026
18.172

158.35
253.95
71.316
80.656
99.231
99.989
1

201.5
280.3
100.724
139.284
124.132
116.605
304

98.2
207.8
46.763
55.462
73.234
70.466
1

32.922
20.548
17.036
18.083
14.038
12.957
57.43

372
252
372
372
216
216
372

Notes: Data for El Paso Employment corresponds to the period 1980:01 – 2010:12; for U.S. Industrial
production Index corresponds to period 1980:01 – 2010:12; for the Real Peso/Dollar exchange rate
corresponds to period 1980:01 – 2010:12; for Indicador Global De la Actividad Economica corresponds
to period 1993:01 – 2010:12; for Mexico Industrial Production Index corresponds to period 1993:01 –
2010:12; for Ciudad Juárez Homicides corresponds to period 1980:01 – 2010:12 after adjustments.

Ciudad Juarez Homicides
350

300
250
200
150

Ciudad Juarez
Homicides

100
50

Source: Presidencia de la Republica: México.
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Nov-10

Jul-10

Mar-10

Nov-09

Jul-09

Mar-09

Nov-08

Jul-08

Mar-08

Nov-07

Jul-07

Mar-07

Nov-06

0

Table 16: Descriptive Statistics (Quarterly)
Variable
(Frequency: Quarterly)
El Paso Unemployment
Rate
U.S. Ind. Produc. Index
Peso/Dollar Exchange Rate
I.G.A.E.
MX. Ind. Prod. Index
El Paso Retail Sales
Ciudad Juárez Homicides

Mean

Median

Maximum

Minimum

Std. Dev.

# of obs.

9.206
73.676
85.272
98.1
98.026
824.845
52.774

9.283
71.712
81.438
99.191
99.999
796.475
1

12.633
100.507
138.569
120.55
116.466
1181.06
806

5.633
47.148
57.301
74.132
72.068
551.03
1

2.051
17.086
17.965
14.064
12.992
166.7905
169.62

84
124
124
72
72
124
124

Notes: Data for El Paso Employment corresponds to the period 1980:Q1 – 2010:Q4; for U.S. Industrial
production Index corresponds to period 1980:Q1 – 2010:Q4; for the Real Peso/Dollar exchange rate
corresponds to period 1980:Q1 – 2010:Q4; for Indicador Global De la Actividad Economica
corresponds to period 1993:Q1 – 2010:Q4; for Mexico Industrial Production Index corresponds to
period 1993:Q1 – 2010:Q4; for El Paso Real Retail Sales correspond to period 1980:01 – 2010:12; for
Ciudad Juárez Homicides corresponds to period 1980:Q1 – 2010:Q4 after adjustments.

Ciudad Juarez Homicides
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2006:Q3
2006:Q4
2007:Q1
2007:Q2
2007:Q3
2007:Q4
2008:Q1
2008:Q2
2008:Q3
2008:Q4
2009:Q1
2009:Q2
2009:Q3
2009:Q4
2010:Q1
2010:Q2
2010:Q3
2010:Q4

Ciudad Juarez
Homicides

Source: Presidencia de la Republica: México

Table 17: Ciudad Juárez Employment and Retail Sales Index
Year

Ciudad Juárez Employment

2004

333.366

2005

357.338

2006

369.258

% Change

Retail Sales Index

%
Change2

104.80

7.191%
3.336%
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112.60
119.30

7.443%
5.950%

2007

372.438

2008

322.737

2009

302.365

2010

312.920

0.861%
-13.345%
-6.312%
3.491%

53

127.77
126.06
119.40
121.03

7.100%
-1.338%
-5.283%
1.365%
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